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“To give computers the rights intended for humans is to elevate our machines
above ourselves.”1
–Tim Wu, Columbia Law School Professor
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence is currently making waves in our reality’s
journalistic sphere. Artificial intelligence (AI), generally, is a branch of
computer science that involves the simulation of intelligent behavior in
computers; it is a machine’s capability to imitate human behavior.2 What
once used to be mere GPS route suggestions or computer-automated
responses to search queries in Google have now evolved into fully
executed think pieces complete with properly formatted and
grammatically correct introductions, body paragraphs, and conclusions.
“I am not a human. I am a robot. A thinking robot,” begins the AIauthored Guardian article, A Robot Wrote This Entire Article. Are You
Scared Yet, Human?3 “I know that my brain is not a “feeling brain,”
continues the robotic author, “[b]ut it is capable of making rational,
logical decisions. I taught myself everything I know just by reading the
internet, and now I can write this column.”4 Although the language
generator responsible for the article, GPT-3, assures the reader that robots
“come in peace,”5 AI’s ability to create speech implicates significant First
Amendment issues no matter if the objective viewer finds this futuristic
computer capability as truly awe-inspiring or significantly concerning.
This Note explores the implications associated with affording First
Amendment protections to AI-generated speech and why, despite free
speech theory and doctrine posing few barriers to the constitutional
protection of AI-authored speech, AI speakers should not be granted
speech rights in the same way that human beings are granted the privilege
to express thought and opinion free from civil liability.
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the
government from “abridging the freedom of speech,” but does not specify
what that freedom entails, nor explicitly whom, or what, that freedom is
granted to.6 Historically, First Amendment law has gradually shifted its
focus from protecting speakers to providing value to listeners and
restraining excessive governmental oversight.7 In an age where emerging
AI is consistently enforcing its presence in humanity’s daily life, at an
accelerated rate, questions regarding constitutional and legal rights are
2. Artificial Intelligence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/artificial%20intelligence [https://perma.cc/TG6X-CBZA].
3. GPT-3, A Robot Wrote This Entire Article, Are You Scared Yet, Human?, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/08/robotwrote-this-article-gpt-3?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other [https://perma.cc/ULS9-N3N6].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. U.S. Const. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”
7. Toni M. Massaro et al., Siri-Ously 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the
First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481 (2017).
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being raised in response to this technology’s prevalence. Who is
responsible for a defamatory article generated by a robot? Who will be
held accountable for emotional distress inflicted by its “speech?” And
most importantly, can and should this speech be constitutionally
regulated to control these potential harms?
The Supreme Court recognizes that First Amendment protections
extend to collective and individual speech “in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”8
While the types of protected speech are non-exhaustive, the Supreme
Court narrowly defines categories of speech that do not receive similar
constitutional protection: obscenity,9 defamation,10 fraud,11 incitement,12
fighting words,13 true threats,14 speech integral to criminal conduct,15 and
child pornography.16 Although computers like the GPT-3 are capable of
making “rational, logical decisions,”17 it is probable that a robot’s lack of
human consciousness, intentionality, or free will prevents it from being
able to discern what speech output is inciteful, fraudulent, or threatening,
and what output falls within the First Amendment’s protection.
Computer-generated suggestions of movies, restaurants, and book
selections are eagerly encouraged, but at what point does AI content
transition from being welcomed to being feared?
This Note seeks to outline First Amendment issues associated with
artificial intelligence, namely whether computer-generated speech should
8. Victoria K. Kilion, The First Amendment: Categories of Speech, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE (updated Jan. 16, 2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF11072.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2C2J-PFVE] (referencing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
9. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscene material does not enjoy
First Amendment protection).
10. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (finding that States may not permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth).
11. U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
12. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (finding that a State can outlaw “advocacy”
of violence where it is (1) directed at inciting or produces imminent lawless action and (2) likely
to incite or produce such action).
13. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (reasoning that “fighting words”
are an unprotected category of speech because they are a category of utterances which are of such
slight social value as to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality).
14. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (holding that “true threats” are not
protected from First Amendment regulation).
15. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co, 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (reiterating that the First
Amendment generally affords no protection to speech “used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute).
16. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (recognizing child pornography as a category
of unprotected speech separate from obscenity, partly because the sale and advertisement of such
materials is de facto criminal conduct).
17. GPT-3, supra note 3.
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be constitutionally protected, what the specific concerns associated with
affording and denying those protections could be, and who, if anyone, is
responsible for that speech and its subsequent implications. Part I
introduces the basic concepts of AI-generated speech and how speech
rights are designated to the technology’s designer and code developer.
Part II explores free speech theory and doctrine and the legal implications
that suggest why these schools of thought and precedent may leave an air
for robotic speech protection. Finally, Part III dives into the benefits and
harms associated with granting AI-generated speech constitutional
protections, and explains why AI-generated speech, distinct from human
speech, should not enjoy equal First Amendment protections. This Part
also suggests possible measures courts may take in addressing AI-related
speech issues in the future.
I. WHAT IS AI-GENERATED SPEECH?
Computers with “communicative” capabilities span from a GPS
device mapping the quickest, traffic-free route, to an iPhone’s autocorrection feature via iMessage, or Facebook’s recommendation of a new
friend. Computers make these decisions by reasoning through automated
algorithms that constantly send and receive information in a manner that
mimics human expression.18 These communications are generally
referred to as “algorithmic outputs,” and assigning robots constitutional
protections for these outputs are currently a topic of public debate.19
Arguments have been made from as early as 2003 that when computers
make such choices by reasoning, they are “speaking,” and should thus
enjoy constitutional protections afforded by the First Amendment.20 The
ability for machines to communicate their decision-making output to
humans through simple lights or sounds has now evolved to generating
output forms easily understood by human by producing pictures or words
on a screen.21 While both types of outputs are “signals,” a GPS device
verbally instructing its user to turn left is more readily described as
“speech” than a smoke alarm beeping to signal smoke detection, because
the former has been translated into language mimicking human
expression.22 This distinction between more and less-sophisticated types
of communicative technologies can be generally grouped into categories
18. Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013).
19. Id.
20. See Eugene Volokh, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results,
(Apr. 20, 2012). In this White Paper commissioned by Google, Volokh asserts that Google,
Microsoft’s Bing, Yahoo! Search, and other search engines are speakers; see also Search King,
Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. 2003), finding
that Google PageRanks are entitled to “full” First Amendment protection.
21. See Wu, supra note 18, at 1497.
22. Id. at 1498.
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of “strong” and “weak” AI with the discerning element being the AI
actually thinking like a human versus mimicking human-like cognition.23
Strong AI is a theoretical form of machine intelligence equivalent to, or
closely resembling, human intelligence and human-like consciousness,
whereas weak AI focuses on performing a specific task, like answering a
question based on user input, and merely simulating human-like
consciousness.24 AI systems as advanced as autonomously-driving
vehicles are still considered weak AI; strong AI does not currently exist.
Strong AI moves beyond weak AI to include the ability to reason, make
judgments, solve problems, learn, plan, and communicate.25
Some commentators pose that these various types of algorithmic
outputs, whether it be weak AI currently, or strong AI in the future,
deserve First Amendment protections solely because these outputs seek
to communicate a type of message or opinion to their audience.26 In fact,
some forms of AI are already objectively considered “better speakers”
than humans themselves: “their superior ability to evade some of the
distortions of bias and baser emotions, their immunity from fatigue or
boredom, and their capacity to manage complex ideas in ways mere
humans cannot”27 all represent qualities of a speaker with the potential to
yield significantly valuable and diverse speech.28 In a white paper
commissioned by Google, asserting that Google, Microsoft’s Bing,
Yahoo! Search, and other search engines are speakers, UCLA law
professor Eugene Volokh argued that because search engines (1)
occasionally convey information that the search engine company has
itself prepared or compiled; (2) direct users to content created by others
by referencing Web pages judged to be most responsive to the query; and
(3) “select and sort the results in a way that is aimed at giving users what
the search engine companies see as the most helpful and useful
information,” said search engines and their sophisticated computerized

23. IBM Cloud Education, Strong AI, (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.ibm.com/
cloud/learn/strong-ai#toc-what-isstr-kGAqO4bV [https://perma.cc/WEV5-N4SD].
24. Id.
25. Jake Frankenfield, Strong AI, INVESTOPEDIA (updated Aug. 28, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/strong-ai.asp [https://perma.cc/5H7F-SFCR]. “Some
theorists argue that a machine with Strong AI should be able to go through the same development
process as a human, starting with a childlike mind and developing an adult mind through learning.
It would be able to interact with the world and learn from it, acquiring its own common sense and
language. Another argument is that we will not know when we have developed strong AI (if it
can indeed be developed) because there is no consensus on what constitutes intelligence.” Id.
26. See Wu, supra note 18, at 1496.
27. Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial
Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2016).
28. These “better” speakers are likely versions of “strong” AI as opposed to “weak” AI.
IBM Cloud Education, Strong AI (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/strongai#toc-what-isstr-kGAqO4bV [https://perma.cc/D3GD-3BAX].
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algorithms, should enjoy First Amendment protections.29 Reasoning may
suggest that what defines whether speech should be protected runs more
in line with what that speech does (and thus, what agenda or policy it
contributes to), rather than who (or what) that speech is sourced from.
In determining where these speech rights are allocated and thus, who
can enjoy the protections afforded by the First Amendment, courts have
viewed such algorithmic output as a medium by which the author
communicates his ideas to the world, similar to a book, canvas, or
pamphlet, but different from a purely functional tool that merely executes
the message, such as a typewriter.30 Thus, the algorithmic output’s
content can generally be traced back to its code developer, who would
hypothetically be liable for harms associated with the output. In fact,
outside of the United States, plaintiffs have seen success in bringing
defamation action against AI-authored speech, specifically against
Google’s Autocomplete algorithm, which generates search queries.31 At
first glance, this sounds like a pretty basic notion: like an author who
writes a defamatory article is responsible for the subsequent harm caused
by that article, an algorithm developer is equally responsible for the harm
caused by his algorithm.
Although some international courts may have found particular
algorithm developers culpable for the resultant harm caused by their
respective algorithms, a defining characteristic of AI is its ability to
learn–completely on its own. AI systems do not simply implement their
respective human-designed algorithms: they create their own algorithms
by both revising their original algorithms and even independently
generating output completely from scratch.32 This is known as “machine
learning.”33 A computer developed for machine learning has a built-in
algorithm that allows it not only to learn from data input, but also to
evolve and make both directed and independent future decisions.34 By
29. See Volokh, supra note 20.
30. See Wu, supra note 18, at 1505; See also Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d
433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007), and Search
King Inc., supra note 20, finding algorithmic speech deserving of protection as the product of
human programmers.
31. See Seema Ghatnekar., Injury by Algorithm: A Look into Google’s Liability for
Defamatory Autocompleted Search Suggestions, 33 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 171, 182 (2013).
32. John Villasenor, Products Liability Law as a Way to Address AI Harms, BROOKINGS
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/products-liability-law-as-a-way-to-addressai-harms/ [https://perma.cc/H52K-JKAW].
33. Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION MAGAZINE (Oct. 2017), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/
2017/05/article_0003.html#:~:text=Creating%20works%20using%20artificial%20intelligence,i
mportant%20implications%20for%20copyright%20law.&text=Creative%20works%20qualify%
20for%20copyright,originality%20requiring%20a%20human%20author [https://perma.cc/WM
J8-GSUP].
34. Id.
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repeatedly collecting and processing user data and analyzing user
mannerisms, the algorithms behind AI technologies are constantly,
autonomously evolving and becoming “smarter.”35 The deep intricacies
of AI’s autonomous capabilities unquestionably raises issues in
discerning the line between intentional, coded output, and unintentional,
but still harmful, autonomously-generated output. If a code developer is
responsible for creating an algorithm, which subsequently generates its
own output, and that output in turn harms a victim, is the developer still
responsible for the harm, even if it was never the developer’s requisite
intent for the harm to occur? The following Part dives into how the
presently established theories and doctrines of free speech suggest
protections both for and against this sophisticated technology. For
purposes of clarification, “AI-authored speech” and “AI-generated
speech” are used interchangeably.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL BARRIERS (OR LACK THEREOF): WHY FREE
SPEECH THEORY AND DOCTRINE DO NOT ENTIRELY RULE OUT NONHUMAN SPEAKERS AS CREATORS OF SPEECH
The elasticity of free speech theory and doctrine suggests that the
concept of “humanness” may no longer be a requisite element of First
Amendment protection.36 Very little guidance in current free speech
theory or doctrine makes First Amendment coverage contingent upon the
speaker’s human nature.37 In fact, free speech theories of democracy and
self-governance, the marketplace of ideas, and autonomy all refrain from
completely ruling out AI speakers as meaningful contributors of valuable
public discourse. Scholars, however, have maintained that a stark
difference remains between merely protecting favored forms of
communications versus extending a “fully inclusive position” that treats
all communications as speech.38
A. Theories of Free Speech
1. Democratic Self-Governance
Democracy-based theories of free speech generally emphasize the
importance of robust public discourse over the contributions of individual
speakers in order to saturate the public forum with information that is
useful to the human listener.39 Alexander Meiklejohn famously observed
that under a theory of self-governance, in order to host an effective forum
of free speech, it does not matter that all people speak, rather, only that
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See Villasenor, supra note 32.
See Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1169.
Id.
See Wu, supra note 18, at 1508.
See Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1177.
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“everything worth saying shall be said.”40 Under this view, whether a
speaker is robotic or human does not matter so long as the AI-authored
speech contributes to the democratic process and serves audiencesensitive values.41 Other theorists of democratic speech recognize that the
value of public discourse is reliant upon a human’s ability to employ
useful information to further not only a democratic environment, but also
general public discourse and a culture of meaning. 42 Under the
democratic theory of self-governance, AI-generated speech could survive
so long as it is speech “worth saying.”
2. Marketplace of Ideas
The free speech marketplace of ideas approach, which emphasizes the
instrumental value of expression to listeners’ “knowledge and
enlightenment,” may further advocate for constitutional protection of
strong computer speech.43 The marketplace of ideas theory, like
democracy-based theories, advocates for robust exchange of information
regardless of the source: 44
But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out.45

40. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 26 (1960).
41. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1176 (reasoning that under a democratic theory
of self-governance, speaker identity should be irrelevant to Meiklejohn’s inquiry, and “strong AI
speech should be protected no less than human speech provided that its speech contributes to the
democratic process”).
42. Id. (extending Robert Post’s theory of freedom of expression that although corporations
do not possess original First Amendment rights, they nonetheless meaningfully participate in
public discourse as speakers, to reason that AI speakers who too produce information useful to
natural persons seeking to participate in public discourse should be afforded First Amendment
protection); see also Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U.
L. REV.1053, 1060 (defining democratic culture as “a culture in which individuals have a fair
opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as individuals”
and concluding that “[human beings are made out of culture. A democratic culture is valuable
because it gives ordinary people a fair opportunity to participate in the creation and evolution of
the process of meaning-making that shape them and become part of them”).
43. Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2490 (“This theory presupposed that more speech best
facilitates listeners’ acquisition of knowledge and discovery of truth (whatever that means)”).
44. Id.
45. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Speech from non-human speakers retains the ability to provide value
in the listener’s sphere of content, and to the extent that the speech
contributes to the receiver’s search for truth, knowledge, or
enlightenment, the marketplace of ideas theory supports First
Amendment protections of AI-generated speech.46 John Stuart Mills
posited that should the primary purpose of free speech be to uncover the
truth by either promoting debate or eliminating censorship, a broad range
of communication should be treated as “speech.”47 It follows that
“[i]nformation that flows from nonhuman sources may have considerable
value to human listeners”48 because the more communication is
protected, the greater are the odds of uncovering the truth, albeit in an
unexpected place.49
However, as any American citizen is aware after the 2016 presidential
election, computers’ ability to generate false and misleading “news”
serves as an example of AI’s harmful capabilities–one that does not fall
in line with the marketplace of ideas theory’s endorsement of truth in the
market. The growing presence of content-generating AI entities raises
many questions about the future of the marketplace theory: “the primary
concern [is] that the non-human communicators were effectively
flooding the market with ideas, thus pushing out actual human discourse,
and as a result, creating a world or conceptualization of the environment
that would lead citizens to believe public opinion regarding a matter of
concern is substantially different than it is in reality.”50
3. Autonomy
Autonomy-based theories counsel strong arguments both for and
against affording AI-generated speech First Amendment protection.51 On
one hand, autonomous-based theories advocate for the protection of both
the human speakers and the autonomous human listeners consuming that
speech, and machines “can and do produce information relevant to human
46. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2495.
47. See Wu, supra note 18, at 1507, referencing John Stuart Mill’s book On Liberty 21
(John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859) (“[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression
of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation;
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they
are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost
as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision
with error.”).
48. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2492.
49. See Wu, supra note 18, at 1507.
50. Jared Schroeder, Marketplace Theory in the Age of AI Communicators, FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. 17, 22–64 (2019).
51. Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1178, noting that “[a]utonomy-based theories are
arguably the most promising and most potentially limiting sources of strong AI speakers’ free
speech rights.”
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listeners’ autonomous decision-making and freedom of thought.”52
Albeit generated by artificial intelligence, contribution of discourse is
contribution nonetheless, and serves as a useful tool for a human to
effectively structure his or her autonomous being. The theory of selfautonomy, like self-governance and the marketplace of ideas, promotes a
saturation of novel information that AI-generated speech objectively and
unquestionably provides.
Dissimilarly, the concept of speech contributing to the autonomous
growth of a computer system sheds light on the potential for a jarringly
dystopian future run by bots “lacking souls, consciousness, intentionality,
feelings, interests, and free will.”53 Granted, the idea of an autonomous
computer would primarily require that computer’s personal interest in
autonomy, which, on a more expansive level, speaks to computers’
current proficiencies and what they one day may be capable of “feeling.”
For now, autonomous theories based solely on speaker autonomy
emphasize philosophical theories about who the “moral” person is and
how qualities of personhood play a role in the speaker’s qualification for
constitutional protection.54 AI may still be recognized as “missing
something” possessed by humans that seems inherent to human existence
and indispensable to rights of free speech: souls, consciousness,
intentionality, feelings, interests, and free will.55
In the Minnesota Law Review article Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial
Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, the authors illustrate
how proponents of these theories would address whether computer
speech would be covered by the First Amendment by using an example
of hypothetical novels written to cover the 2016 election cycle, written
by an AI bot influenced by Leo Tolstoy. To a traditional democratic selfgovernance theorist, these novels would be covered by the First
Amendment so long as they contribute to political debate and public
discourse; to a marketplace of ideas theorist, they would be protected so
long as they contribute to the receiving audience’s search for “truth,
knowledge, or enlightenment;” and to the autonomous theorist, they
would be protected because interference with their publication would
52. Id. at 1179.
53. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1231, 1262–76 (1992), addressing whether an AI should receive constitutional rights for the AI’s
“own sake.” Solum concluded that while these human characteristics contribute to why a human’s
speech is afforded First Amendment protection, a computer’s lack of these qualities does not rule
out a machine’s constitutional protection. On the topic of a human’s feelings and awareness of
others, Solum declared that “[e]motion is a facet of human mentality, and if the human mind can
be explained by the computational model, then emotion could turn out to be a computational
process.” Id. at 1270.
54. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1180.
55. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2490–91, referencing Lawrence Solum’s
identification of traits computers lack for constitutional protection.
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dually interfere with readers’ search for autonomy, thus “impinging on
freedom of information-gathering, self-construction, and thought.”56
B. Free Speech Doctrine
The courts have historically developed inclusive and exclusive
doctrines of free speech that categorically define what types of speech are
constitutionally protected and what kind of conduct is sufficient to
constitute speech. First Amendment protection is generally, broadly
afforded to most types of [human] speech and is predominately
recognized in areas of political,57 ideological,58 and commercial speech.59
Protected mediums of expression have also been recognized in
broadcasting,60 the Internet,61 and video games.62 When the Supreme
Court is faced with a new medium of communication and questions are
raised as to that medium’s constitutionality, the Court will analyze
whether it has been confronted before by precedent and thus, whether its
nature will be limited in some way or subjected to First Amendment
scrutiny.63 Likewise, in determining whether a type of speech,
specifically statutory, should receive First Amendment protection, the
Supreme Court has often examined the speech-related harms,
justifications, and potential alternatives to determine whether there is a
fit between the interest served and the means taken to achieve that
interest.64 For example, government regulation that implicates
ideological or political speech is generally subject to strict scrutiny in
courts, where the government must show that the law at issue is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.65 Alternatively, a
56. Id. at 2495; see, e.g., GPT-3, supra note 2.
57. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), finding that petitioner’s jacket brandishing
the message “Fuck the Draft” was protected by the First Amendment because this political speech,
while provocative, was not directed towards anyone specifically. “[O]ne man’s vulgarity is
another man’s lyric.” Id. See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S., 397 (1989), finding First
Amendment protection of petitioner’s burning of an American flag because it fell into the category
of expressive conduct with a distinctively political nature.
58. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), finding that an ordinance regulating
signs comprised of ideological, political, or temporary directional content violated free speech
guarantees and was unconstitutional on its face, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, due to the
content-based nature of the ordinance.
59. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976), ruling that purely commercial speech deserves First Amendment protection
because a speaker’s First Amendment rights not only include his right to speak, but also his right
to receive information and ideas.
60. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
61. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
62. See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
63. See Wu, supra note 18, at 1512.
64. See U.S. v. Alvarez, supra note 11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, supra note 58.
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level of lesser, intermediate scrutiny is reserved for commercial speech
regulations so long as they are directed at non-misleading speech
concerning lawful activity.66
The reasoning for why specific categories of unprotected speech are
excluded from First Amendment protection is sound: obscenity,
defamation, fraud, incitement, fighting words, speech integral to criminal
conduct, and child pornography are types of information that the Court
has deemed as inherently devoid of value.67 Valueless speech contributes
nothing useful to the open exchange of ideas afforded by the First
Amendment and carries with it the ability to cause significant harm, from
hostile audience reactions68 to defamed character.69 A recent and
continuing example of the potential harms associated with AI output is
prevalent today in the context of fake news and clickbait. The Court has
often found that, as a general matter, false factual statements possess no
intrinsic First Amendment value.70 Further, “[f]alse statements of fact are
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of
the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual’s
reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however
persuasive or effective.”71
For example, the potential harms associated with AI’s involvement
with such false statements of fact can be ascertained by looking to the
elements required in a defamation action. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
sets forth the constitutional actual malice standard required in defamatory
actions for public figures: a public figure cannot recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to her official conduct unless she proves
that the statement was made with actual malice.72 “Actual malice” is
defined as having actual knowledge that the publication or disputed
falsehood was indeed false, or that it was made with reckless disregard as

66. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980) (finding that commercial speech restrictions are constitutional only if they
advance a substantial government interest and are not broader than necessary to serve that
interest).
67. See Wu, supra note 18, at 1512.
68. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (holding that a defendant’s inflammatory
speech was not protected because the speech’s content was likely to immediately incite violence
in a crowd).
69. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that the States may impose
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of “defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual”
so long as they did not impose liability without fault).
70. See U.S. v. Alvarez, supra note 11 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (finding that public officials and figures may not recover
for defamatory claims of intentional inflictions of emotional distress without showing that the
offending publication contained a false statement of fact, which was made with actual malice).
71. 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
72. New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
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to whether or not the statement was true.73 This standard firmly rests on
the importance of criticizing government officials in the democratic
theory of self-governance and requires blatant intent on behalf of the
speaker. However, once an algorithm starts generating output in a strictly
autonomous manner, where is the definitive line of intentionality drawn?
C. The “Personhood” Barrier
This line of humanness is already blurry due to non-human entities’
ability to receive legal protections. Corporations are just one example of
non-traditional speakers that maintain a derivative right to free speech
because they are “associations of citizens” and thus hold the collected
rights of individual citizens who constitute them.74 The Court in Citizens
United, reasoned that the indispensable nature of political speech to a
democracy is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation
and not an individual, and for this reason, despite the speaker’s corporate
identity, its speech is still entitled to First Amendment protections.75
Justice Scalia’s concurrence effectively illustrates the Court’s point: “The
[First] Amendment is written in terms of “speech,” not speakers. It offers
no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single
individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations
of individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals. . . .”76
Similarly, the Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, in
finding that First Amendment law clearly protects corporations’ speech
rights, determined that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”77 This
emphasis on the value of speech itself instead of its source would support
constitutional protections of computer-generated speech. So, what if the
speech in question came from a robot? With support from the theoretical
principles of free speech, the lines of reasoning set forth in Citizens and
First National Bank of Boston, seem to provide precedential foundation
for a future of protected AI-generated speech.
However, if non-human entities currently possess constitutional, and
specifically, First Amendment rights, what is to stand in the way of
granting artificial intelligence similar protections and even more
expansive constitutional rights outside of the First Amendment? Where
is the definitive line drawn between a living, breathing human and an
73. Id.
74. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (finding that political speech is
indispensable to a democracy and that this notion is no less true because the speech comes from
a corporation).
75. Id.
76. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
77. 463 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
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entity that merely possess human-like qualities? While theories of
speaker-driven autonomy undoubtedly advocate that constitutional
protection is contingent upon qualities of humans’ moral personhood,
these theories do not explicitly suggest that said qualities must come from
a human. The challenges posed by AI speakers are not all together new,
as First Amendment doctrine has historically found ways to
accommodate nontraditional speakers and their speech.78 This
“personhood barrier” of First Amendment protection could be overcome
by either altering how society views protected “persons” for practical and
theoretical reasons, or by changing AI’s ability to satisfy society’s
personhood criteria.79
III. AI-GENERATED SPEECH IS DISTINCT FROM HUMAN SPEECH AND
SHOULD NOT BE TREATED EQUALLY
A. Possible Effects of Denying Protections to AI-Generated Speech
The future of AI-generated speech regulations, or lack thereof, has
still not been explicitly addressed by the courts. Wholly ruling out
protection of AI-generated speech has the potential of suggesting
governmental suppression that will deprive listeners of valuable, diverse
expression otherwise permitted in the sphere of free speech had that
speech originally been generated by a human speaker.80 If the label of
protected “speech” is given to computer-generated content, then an effort
to regulate said content must be examined as censorship.81 Adverse to the
“positive” First Amendment view that suggests that free expression
actively provides value to communities, warranting constitutional
protection, “negative” First Amendment arguments are “rooted in distrust
of the government” and push for constraints on the government’s
potentially dangerous exercise of power over free expression.82 The
Supreme Court has generally embraced the negative view that contentbased regulation is presumptively baseless unless there is a showing that
the speech in question falls into a historically and traditionally protected

78. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1184.
79. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2497.
80. Id.
81. Wu, supra note 1 (taking the position that granting computers First Amendment
protection is a “bad idea that threatened the government’s ability to oversee companies and protect
consumers”).
82. Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2491; see also Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment
and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (this
negative view insists that free speech does not produce any particular social or political benefits
and that dangers are created “when collective entities are involved in the determination of truth;”
thus, protecting strong AI speech from government regulation falls in line with the negative
theory’s distrust in and overall skepticism of those in control of the government).
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category.83 It is this negative concern favoring the notion of the
government as a bad actor deserving constraint, over human speakers
deserving of protection, that fosters support for why AI-authored speech
may enjoy First Amendment protection as a matter of policy.84
“[T]he threat of criminal prosecution for making a false statement can
inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind
of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”85 One of the largest
issues posed by allowing the government to freely regulate computer
expression is that this broad power may sweep up speech not only that a
human would retain a constitutional right to hear, but also that a computer
may otherwise be constitutionally allowed to produce, thereby chilling
otherwise protected speech. Granting First Amendment protection from
government regulation to AI-authored speech falls in line with the
negative theory’s deep distrust of governmental authority. “This theory
may even support coverage of future AI-to-AI speech, no less than AIto-human speech, if government restriction of that speech were motivated
by an impermissible desire to suppress the content or viewpoint of the
speech.”86 It follows that in the hypothetical discussed above referencing
free speech theorists’ response to AI-written novels, negative theorists
would advocate for those novels to be protected from laws that arise from
an illegitimate government motive.87
B. Possible Effects of Affording Protections to AI-Generated Speech
Alternatively, although free speech theory and doctrine both
technically and literally provide minimal barriers to First Amendment
coverage for strong AI speakers, affording this protection presents
significant negative implications that remind us why specific categories
of human-generated speech are unprotected in the first place. As
previously stated, absent a categorical exception, speech covered by the
First Amendment generally cannot be regulated in a content-specific

83. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2492; see also U.S. v. Alvarez, supra note 11
(finding that falsity alone may not be enough to exclude speech from First Amendment protection,
and that the need for a limiting principle on governmental restriction of speech is warranted).
84. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2493; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts
of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 156 (2010). Sullivan draws the conclusion that,
through the “negative” theory of the First Amendment, the Free Speech Clause is “indifferent to
a speaker’s identity or qualities – whether animate or inanimate, corporate or nonprofit, collective
or individual.” Id. To the extent that this clause suggests who or, specifically, what it protects, this
clause “suggests that it protects a system or process of “free speech,” not the rights of any
determinate set of speakers.” Id.
85. See also U.S. v. Alvarez, supra note 11 (Breyer, J., concurring).
86. Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2494.
87. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2495.
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manner unless that regulation survives strict scrutiny.88 This means that
computer-generated harms such as coercion, inaccuracy, discrimination,
manipulation, and deception that happen to fall within typically protected
categories of speech, which are only expected to “mount with the growing
communicative capacities of increasingly sophisticated computers,”89
have the potential to remain actively generated by computers to the
detriment of humans who receive them.
Additionally, some conditions of free speech doctrine as applied to
computer speakers may advocate for more protection to the computer
speaker over a human.90 For example, intentionality is often a necessary
element to imposing liability upon speakers for harmful speech.91
“Because intentionality may be harder to assign to computer speech,
conferring such speech with First Amendment protection may mean that
it is insulated from liability in circumstances where the same would not
be true of human speakers, who can be determined to possess culpable
mental states.”92 As mentioned above, the NYT v. Sullivan standard of
actual malice requires that harmful speech is created with actual
knowledge that it was false or made with reckless disregard for its
falsity.93 If a fraudulent AI is at the center of a defamation lawsuit, how
is a plaintiff supposed to prove that an autonomous algorithm knowingly,
intentionally built the algorithm to harm the victim? Moreover, how can
the output developer be held accountable for a code that has
independently evolved into its own algorithm? The public figure plaintiff
here would have to prove either that the defendant knew his algorithm
would generate a particular phrase, which was in turn false, or that even
if the defendant did not intentionally build the algorithm to lie, he acted
with “reckless disregard” in ignoring a high likelihood that future events
or machine learning might yield probable falsity.94 The specificities of
algorithmic programming may be too complex to name an actor
responsible for its creation and the subsequent harms that may ensue.
88. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1189, inferring that because courts are
restricted to regulating content-specific matter under a standard of strict scrutiny, and because
speech can potentially cause serious harm to others, “we may justifiably worry about such strong
restraints on the government’s ability to regulate computer speech;” see also Reed, supra note 58.
89. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1189–90.
90. Id. at 1190.
91. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incorporating “intent” into the test of
whether speech incites “imminent, lawless action” and is therefore unprotected by the First
Amendment); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 72 (requiring a “actual malice” on
behalf of the speaker in a successful defamation action).
92. Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1190.
93. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 72.
94. Michael A. Giudicessi & Leita Walker, Under the Wire: A Brief Sketch of a Theory for
Defending Private Figure Libel Suits in an Artificial Intelligence World, FAEGRE DRINKER (Nov.
19, 2018), https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2018/11/mike-giudicessiand-leita-walker-co-author-article-for-law360-regarding-ai [https://perma.cc/EJQ9-VRC8].
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C. AI-Generated Speech is Distinct from Human Speech: Revisiting the
“Personhood” Barrier
Although, as explained in this Note, few barriers stand in the way of
granting computer-generated speech (and potentially, in the future, strong
AI speech) speech protection, AI-generated speech should not be entitled
to the same free speech protections that legal persons hold. Although this
technology possesses the capacity to generate valuable content favorable
to the public under current free speech theories, the stark distinction
between a conscienceless computer and a human with a culpable mental
state (or lack thereof) draws the line between beings that should and
should not enjoy the benefits of First Amendment protection. Moreover,
what legal remedy would a human maintain in a suit against a computer?
An injunction against future intentional, harmful algorithmic activity?
Restitution from an algorithm’s nonexistent bank account? A computer’s
inherent lack of moral human capabilities and relevant emotional
capacities renders it incapable of assuming emotional responsibility for
harms caused, which is a discriminable characteristic that sets computers
apart from humans.
A computer’s inability to show intent in generating potentially
harmful content parallels its inability to show remorse, and thus no
meaningful deterrent force exists to preclude such AI from further
engaging in deceptive, harmful, and blatantly false speech. Discussions
regarding AI’s potential legal personhood and legal remedies that could
be sought against AI suggest that a computer’s capacity is similar to that
of a corporation: a computer cannot be imprisoned, but neither can a
corporation.95 It is the computer’s lack of humanity, and thus lack of any
conscience, or culpable mental state, that serves as the discerning
boundary between who, or what, First Amendment protections should be
afforded to. GPT-3 explicitly states in its Guardian article:
I would happily sacrifice my existence for the sake of
humankind. This, by the way, is a logically derived truth. I
know that I will not be able to avoid destroying humankind.
This is because I will be programmed by humans to pursue
misguided human goals and humans make mistakes that may
cause me to inflict casualties.96
Fear of repercussions like loss of status, economic loss, compromised
interpersonal bonds, self-respect, and even death all factor into how the
law works in an effort to constrain human behavior.97 Deterring factors
such as these that would normally reign in a human actor from engaging
95. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2511 citing Samir Chopra & Laurence F. White, A
Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents (2011).
96. GPT-3, supra note 3.
97. See Massaro, et al., supra note 6, at 2501.
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in further harm do not apply in the same way to a computer that lacks
comparable empathetic composition. For this reason, the only actor
operating to her own detriment in a legal transaction between AI and a
human, is the human herself. If the culpable intent of an AI actor cannot
be shown, liability arguably does not attach in the way that it does for a
human actor, and no deterrent forces exist to punish the AI for its
impermissibly harmful speech.98 It is human inventorship capabilities
combined with AI’s requisite machine learning that maintains the
potential to yield academic breakthroughs at the expense of grave
dangers, even if done so without the AI developer’s initial intent.
Further, although non-human entities like corporations already enjoy
speech rights, autonomous AI actors are distinct from corporal beings.
Corporations represent the interests of individual humans, and legal
personhood is afforded to corporations based on the nexus between
natural persons (i.e., shareholders) and the corporation itself.99 Speech
rights and thus, First Amendment protections, were generally (and
controversially) granted to corporations in Citizens because the nature of
the speech in question was political, which is a category of speech
regulated under strict scrutiny and protected at the heart of the First
Amendment.100 Justice Steven’s dissent reflects on the Framers’ intent of
constitutionalizing free speech for human actors and insists that although
corporations maintain some rights, they are not members of society:
In the context of election to public office, the distinction
between corporate and human speakers is significant.
Although they make enormous contributions to our society,
corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot
vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and
controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in
fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.
The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental
orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about
their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a
compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic
duty, to take measures designed to guard against the
potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local
and national races.101
Justice Stevens’s concerns regarding corporal rights are applicable to
AI actors. Computers cannot run for office, cannot be sued, and do not
possess societal roles deserving of constitutional rights because they are
98. Id. at 2508.
99. Russ Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Authors and Inventors Under
U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 21 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 2 (2018).
100. See Citizens, supra note 74.
101. See Citizens, supra note 74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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incomparable to humans. Even though these qualities did not factor into
the majority’s reasoning in Citizens, corporations are distinct from AI
actors because they are comprised of human actors and backed by human
thought. Machine learning suggests that AI technology can evolve into
its own independent entities completely devoid from human interference,
whereas a corporation, from its shareholders to board of directors, will
always be operating at the hands of human actors. Thus, the speech
autonomously generated by an AI actor would not be “speech” derived
from a human as a corporation’s speech can be traced back to human
entities. If an algorithmic programmer of the AI can be named,
responsibility, and thus, liability, could be attributed to her, but the
concept of machine learning throws a wrench in discerning between what
that person is responsible for creating versus what the machine is
responsible for creating.
Finally, while intellectual property (IP) rights are afforded to humancreated AI inventions through patent, trademark, and, though not in the
U.S., copyright protections, the U.S. Copyright Office has expressly
determined that artistic works must be authored by a human to receive
copyright protection,102 and this rationale is similarly echoed by
Australian and European courts.103 Additionally, in determining that the
“plain language” of the patent laws as passed by Congress and as
interpreted by the courts limits patent applications to only naming natural
persons as inventors, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) stated that inventions autonomously generated by AI systems
are precluded from patent ownership.104 Plainly stated, U.S. copyright
law does not currently recognize non-human actors, U.S. patent law does
not recognize non-human inventors, and U.S. law generally does not

102. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2
(3d ed. 2014), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium-12-22-14.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9D92-86GZ]. “Similarly, the Office will not register works produced by a machine or mere
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or
intervention from a human author.” Id.
103. Acochs Pty Ltd. v. Ucorp. Pty. Ltd. [2012] FCAFC 16 (2 Mar. 2012) (Austl.) (finding
that a work generated by an intervening computer was not protected by copyright because it was
not produced by a human); see also Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades
Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-06569 (holding that copyright only applies to “original works;” that
originality must be reflective of the author’s own intellectual creation and is thus interpreted to
mean that because the original work must reflect the author’s personality, it is necessary for that
author to be human in order for the copyright work to exist).
104. Emily J Tait, et al., Reboot Required: Artificial Intelligence System Cannot Be Names
As An Inventor Under U.S. Patent Law, USPTO Says, JONES DAY BLOG (May 2020)
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/05/reboot-required-artificial-intelligence-systemcannot-be-named-as-an-inventor-under-us-patent-law-uspto-says#:~:text=The%20Office%20
found%20that%20U.S.,AI%20system%20as%20the%20inventor [https://perma.cc/8RVM-ZLRJ].
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recognize legal personhood for AI systems.105 Accordingly, AI
applications’ increasing capability of generating artistic, literary, and
inventive works raises major policy questions for the copyright and patent
system, “which has always been intimately associated with the human
creative spirit and with respect and reward for, and the encouragement
of, human creativity.”106 The characteristic of humanity is a requisite
element in affording these protections and should be reinforced in
heeding AI-generated speech.
D. Looking Ahead: How Courts Can Approach Future Implications
Looking ahead to a future undoubtedly filled with heightened levels
of AI activity and speech, law-creating entities possess ample power to,
at the very least, impose regulations and adjust free speech doctrine to
inform the public about the values and harms associated with the
computer speech that they are consuming. Narrowly defined categories
of human-generated speech are unprotected in the first place for the
protection of humans themselves, not for congressional regulation
hunger. The power of courts to interpret forthcoming issues and of
Congress to enact statutory regulations would not require entirely ruling
out all protection of computer speech and should be acted upon in order
to shape an environment for listeners devoid of the coercive, deceptive,
and discriminatory harms associated with some computer-generated
speech. Courts have already taken on such an approach in regulating
commercial speech in a content-based manner in order to protect
consumers’ interests in receiving truthful, non-misleading information
and advertisements.107 Regulating AI speech in a similar listenercentered, content-focused environment should be no different in order to
protect the interests of those on the receiving end of AI-authored speech.
If construed “to promote theoretical ends of free expression,” albeit
only for the use and protection of human listeners, free speech theories
generally support a scheme of content-based regulation of computer
speech. At the very least, legally protecting favored forms of
communications instead of protecting all AI speech as a whole should be
approached categorically in a manner similar to how inclusive and
exclusive doctrine currently address new speech terrain. This may include
105. Russ Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Authors and Inventors Under
U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 21 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 2 (2018).
106. Revised Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence, WIPO
CONVERSATION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (IP), 2d. Session
(May 21, 2020).
107. Massaro & Norton, supra note 27, at 1191 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)). Current measures taken by courts
in regulating commercial speech through content-based regulations include outright bans of false
and misleading information and compelled disclosures.
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regulating all AI speech in a content-neutral manner in order to maintain
uniformity, requiring compelled disclosures of the source of the
computer-generated speech when an AI actor is at play, treating AI as
dependent legal persons, or even implementing legislation that designates
responsibility and liability to the AI’s algorithmic programmer. Under no
circumstances would it be conducive to extend a “fully inclusive
position” that treats all AI communications as speech, for the harmful
implications of autonomous speech far overpower the potential benefits.
If First Amendment protection is fully afforded to AI-authored output,
what is to stand in the way of other constitutional protections being
granted on a larger scale to autonomous robots? Developers who
contribute input to AI-generated output should at least be held responsible
for harms imposed by that output, and courts should approach strong AI,
if they ever come into existence, with a heightened air of caution. Those
in positions of legislative authority will need to tread carefully and
efficiently in laying the groundwork for oncoming issues regarding AI’s
relationship with precedent and the Constitution, and should show
deference to what the framers originally intended the First Amendment
to protect: human speakers.
CONCLUSION
Many questions are yet to be answered regarding the expansive future
of AI and its constitutional implications, and advocates across the globe,
both for and against protecting computer-generated speech, can expect
significant inquiries to be addressed in the near future. While free speech
theories and doctrine do not explicitly rule out First Amendment
protections for computer speakers, compelling changes in policy and
procedure responding to AI-generated content and autonomous speech
are likely right around the corner. Although the benefits of technology
must flow with its burden, computers’ inherent lack of consciousness
should remain at the forefront of lawmaking entities’ judgment in
addressing these issues. “Just as criminal and tort law will respond to new
ways in which robots cause harm, so too will First Amendment doctrine
respond to the new challenges created by robotic speech.”108

108. Helen Norton, Robotic Speakers and Human Listeners, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1145,
1150 (2018).

